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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
•ooOoo-
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the Interest of 
SUMMERS CHILDREN, 
Persons under 18 years of age. 
No. 14297 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This Is an action seeking the termination of parental 
rights of Orin John Wulfferstein, the father of Tommy Summers 
(June 23, 1970) and Tina Marie Summers (July 18, 1971), under 
the statutory authority of Utah Code Annotated §55-10-109 
(1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From an Order 
terminating the parental rights of Orin John Wulfferstein, 
he appeals. From an Order denying the Motion to Produce 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Additional Testimony and Alternative Request for New Trial 
filed on behalf of Orin John Wulffenstein, he appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
/Appellant Orin John Wulffenstein seeks reversal of 
the Order terminating his parental rights and judgment in 
his favor as a matter of law. In the alternative, Appellant 
Wulffenstein seeks reversal of the Order denying his Motion 
to Produce Additional Testimony and Alternative Request for 
New Trial and judgment in his favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A petition to terminate parental rights was filed on 
March 2, 1972, as to the natural mother, Yvonne Viola Summers 
A supplemental petition was filed on November 14, 1972, so as 
to include the natural father, Orin John Wulffenstein, the 
Appellant in this case. At the time the two petitions were 
filed, Appellant was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison 
and had been so confined since February, 1971. He was 
released on May 15, 1973. From July 26, 1973 to August, 
1974, he was incarcerated in the Salt Lake City and County 
Jail, pursuant to charges which were subsequently dismissed. 
He was transferred from the jail to the Utah State Prison 
in August, 1974, and was subsequently paroled to the Odyssey 
House rehabilitation facility in Salt Lake City. He dis-
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appeared from Odyssey House on October 23, 1974, and his 
whereabouts were unascertained until May 10, 1975. After 
his reappearance he was returned to the Utah State Prison 
where he is presently incarcerated. 
For reasons unknown to Appellant, the hearings 
conducted on the petition to terminate his parental rights 
were not conducted until over two years after the petition 
was filed. He was available for appearance up until the 
time of his disappearance from Odyssey House. The hearing 
was conducted at three sessions, on February 5, March 12, and 
May 8, all in 1975. Appellant did not attend nor was he 
aware of these proceedings. The Court entered an Order 
terminating Appellant's parental rights on May 9, 1975. 
The parental rights of the natural mother were previously 
terminated on June 26, 1974, and she is now deceased. There 
were not then nor are there now other persons desiring to 
adopt Appellant's minor children. In the Order terminating 
the parental rights of Appellant, the Court set a hearing 
for review of the matter on September 11, 1975. 
Oh September 9, the review hearing was conducted. 
At the hearing arguments were advanced concerning a Motion 
to Produce Additional Testimony and Alternative Request for 
New Trial and on Objection to Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, both filed on behalf of Appellant. The Court entered 
-3-
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an Order denying the motion and objection on September 16, 
1975. Attached to this Brief is a copy of an affidavit 
of Appellant, stating the testimony and evidence he would 
have offered on his behalf had the Court granted his request 
do so do and pertaining to his attitude toward resuming 
custody of his minor children, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMANENTLY 
DEPRIVING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS. 
A. The Statutory Grounds for Termination were 
not Established Under the Facts and 
Circumstances of this Case. 
Utah Code Annotated §55-10-109(1) 
sets forth the basis for deprivation of parental rights. 
It provides as follows: 
(1) The Court may decree a termination 
of all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if the Court finds: 
(a) That the parent or parents are 
unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct 
or condition seriously detrimental to the 
child; or 
(b) That the parent or parents have 
abandoned the child. It shall be prima 
facie evidence of abandonment that the 
parent or parents, although having legal 
custody of the child, have surrendered 
physical custody of the child, and for a 
period of six months following such 
surrender have not manifested to the child 
or to the person having the physical custody 
of the child a firm intention to resume 
physical custody or to make arrangements 
for the care of the child; or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A third ground for termination, U.C.A. S55-10-109(1)(c) , is 
not reprinted since it is neither applicable to the instant 
case nor has it been asserted by the parties. The trial 
Court concluded that the minor children of Appellant came 
within the provisions of U.C.A, §55-10-109. 
A Court is prohibited from depriving a parent of the 
custody of its child unless it finds from the evidence the 
necessary facts required to be found for that purpose. 
Appellant contends that he has neither abandoned his minor 
children nor is he unfit or incompetent by reason of conduct 
or conditions seriously detrimental to the children, and 
that therefore the statutory grounds for termination of 
parental rights have not been satisfied. 
1• Appellant Has Not Abandoned or Deserted 
His Minor Children. 
The legal standard for abandonment in Utah 
is set forth by this Court in the case of In Re Adoption 
of Walton, 123 U. 380, 259 P.2d 881 (1953), as follows: 
...abandonment must be with a specific 
intent to do so, - an intent to sever all 
correlative rights and duties incident to 
the relationship. Such intent must be 
proved by him who asserts it, by proof that 
not only preponderates, but which must be 
clear and satisfactory, -something akin 
to that degree of proof necessary to establish 
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or, as 
one authority put it "by clear and indubitable 
evidence." Ld, at 883 (emphasis supplied, 
footnotes omitted). 
-5-
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Although the instant case concerns termination of parental 
rights, as opposed to an adoption which was contemplated in 
the Walton decision, Appellant submits that the standard 
for abandonment is as stringent for termination of parental 
rights as it is for adoption. The factual issue concerned 
in Walton was whether the parent had abandoned, the child 
such that parental consent was not required for another party 
to adopt the child. In the present case, there did not exist 
a third party desiring to adopt the minor children. Thus 
the desirability for a Court finding abandonment here is 
diminished. 
In applying the Walton principles of abandonment to 
the instant case, there has been no clear and satisfactory 
showing of an intent by Appellant to abandon his minor children. 
The Findings of Fact entered by the trial Court state that 
Appellant has (1) not provided financial support; (2) had 
little or no contact; and (3) not manifested an intent to 
resume custody. While the third finding is not conceded by 
Appellant and is attacked, infra, these Findings are none-
theless insufficient to establish the specific intent required 
in the Walton standard. 
This Court elaborated on the concept of abandoment 
in the case of In Re Adoption of Jameson, 20 U.2d 53, 432 
P.2d 881 (1967), where the factual issue presented was again 
whether the parent had abandoned the child such that parental 
-6-
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to incarceration support a finding of abandonment. 
The Maestas decision offers additional reasons why 
the adoption decisions of this Court are good authority in 
resolving the abandonment issue in a termination of parental 
rights proceeding, at least under the facts and circumstances 
of this case. The resolution of the abandonment question 
does not contemplate the best interests of the child, but 
is limited to the standard of abandonment. As the Court 
stated: 
The trial court properly held that the 
question of the welfare of the child is 
not material in a judicial determination 
of abandonment. Where the custody of the 
child is being determined, as in a case 
of habeas corpus, the welfare of the child 
is of paramount importance. However, in 
the instant matter the custody of the child 
was not directly involved. The controversy 
was as to whether or not the father had 
abandoned the child so that an adoption 
might be had without his consent thereto 
being given in writing. Jjd, at 494 (emphasis 
supplied, footnotes omitted). 
In the present case, as in the adoption cases, the custody 
of the minor children is not directly involved. Appellant 
does not seek custody at this time nor could he, due to 
his incarceration, but is concerned with retaining his 
parental rights upon release. Thus while the welfare of 
the children is pertinent to a custody proceeding, it has 
no bearing on the initial determination as to whether the 
parent has abandoned the child. 
-8-
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Thus incarceration based on conviction of a felony is not 
conduct or a condition which is considered by itself to be 
seriously detrimental to the children in Utah today,. To 
the same effect is Jameson, Supra; see also Fronk v. State, 
7 U.2d 245, 322 P.2d 397 (1958). The inquiry today is one 
which focuses upon the effect on the children rather than 
specific conduct or condition. Thus a correlation between 
the alleged aggressive criminal behavior and the escape of 
Appellant and its effect upon the children must be shown, 
rather than the fact in and of itself. This requirement 
of correlation is examplified in the Lance holding, which 
concluded there to be insufficient evidence to support a 
finding of behavior seriously detrimental to the children. 
In the absence of such a showing of correlation, 
the alleged aggressive criminal behavior and escape go no 
farther than mere incarceration, and thus do not demonstrate 
conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the children. 
Appellant submits that such a correlation does not exist 
under the facts and circumstances of this case nor was it 
shown at the trial court. To illustrate this proposition, 
it can be shown that in this case Appellant's absence from 
Odyssey House has nothing really to do with his children, 
nor was the length of the departure of such duration to 
disinterest in the children. Further discussion of the 
-10-
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ORDER 
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED that all of the rights of the 
father, Orin John Wulffenstein, including 
residual rights be and they are hereby 
fully and completely terminated; . . . 
and said matter is set for review 
September 11, 1975. 
Appellant subsequently filed an objection to the above 
Findings and Conclusions as not being consistent with the 
evidence presented, which was denied. Appellant at this 
time reasserts his objection to the above Findings and 
Conclusions, and contends that the denial of his objection 
was in error such that the order terminating his parental 
rights must be reversed. 
In the Findings of Fact it is stated that Appellant 
is emotionally unstable and cannot provide the security, 
stability and modeling necessary for his minor children. 
In reality this statement was not a finding but a conclusion 
based on the three subheadings under Finding No. 2. Thus 
this discussion focuses on the factual allegations of the 
subheadings rather than conclusory statement, and Appellant 
would contend that the conclusory statement is unfounded 
and not supported by the record. 
The Court found that Appellant has a long history of 
aggressive criminal behavior, has been incarcerated in prison, 
and has escaped from prison. While Appellant concedes that 
he has been incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, it is 
-12-
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contended that the other two findings are in error. First, 
as to criminal history, Appellant submits that the 
appropriate history to examine is that since the birth of 
his minor children. This is based upon the fact that during 
the prior criminal history Appellant was a juvenile and that 
this period does not accurately reflect his present character. 
It is also based on the proposition that there must be a 
correlation between the conduct or condition and the 
consideration of terminating parental rights. Since the 
birth of his children, Appellant has been convicted of one 
felony (burglary) for which he is now serving sentence at 
the Utah State Prison. The only other adult criminal 
adjudication on the record before the trial court was a 
revocation of parole, which was based on criminal charges 
that were subsequently dismissed. One adult felony conviction 
and one parole violation are not sufficient to demonstrate 
a history of criminal behavior. As to escape, no evidence 
was introduced that Appellant escaped from the Utah State 
Prison nor has he ever so escaped. Evidence was introduced 
that he left Odyssey House against medical advice in October 
1974, and a warrant was subsequently issued for his arrest 
by the Utah State Board of Pardons. However, he has not 
been charged nor convicted of escape with regard to leaving 
Odyssey House. Thus it was error to find that Appellant 
escaped from the Utah State Prison. 
-13-
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The Court also made findings which purported to 
show abandonment by Appellant of his children. The 
findings that he has not provided financial support and 
that he has had little or no contact with the children 
do not support a showing of abandonment for reasons 
elaborated in POINT I.A. Again it must be pointed out 
that Appellant has been incarcerated for the substantial 
duration of his children's lives and thus unable to support 
or contact them. The finding that he has not manifested 
any intention to resume custody of said children is not 
supported by the record, and in fact is clearly refuted by 
testimony offered in evidence by the State of Utah. The 
record discloses that most of the witnesses never discussed 
the family relations in interview with Appellant,, and the 
testimony of the children's social worker demonstrates 
Appellant's continuing desire to have eventual custody of 
his children (Transcript, p. 18, In. 21-25; p. 20, In. 30 
to p. 21, In. 10; p. 22, In. 12-14). Thus a finding of 
no intent to resume custody, where such intent has been 
shown in testimony not refuted elsewhere in the record, 
is clearly error. The finding that Appellant's whereabouts 
are unknown is only partially true. While his wereabouts 
were concededly unknown as of the date the Findings were 
entered by the Court, his whereabouts as of the date the 
the review hearing was conducted in September, 1975, were 
known. 
-14-
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The grant of the review hearing impliedly contemplated that 
the previous Findings were not necessarily final, but would 
encompass subsequent events up to the date set for review. 
Thus it was error to make a finding that Appellant's 
whereabouts were unknown, without modifying such a finding 
upon Appellant's return prior to the review hearing. 
Since it was error to find that Appellant is unfit 
or incompetent by reason of conduct or conditions seriously 
detrimental to the children, or that he abandoned the 
children, since in each case the underlying reasons for 
each finding were not supported by the record, it was error 
in turn to conclude that Appellant's children were within 
the provisions of U.C.A. §55-10-109(1), and to terminate 
Appellant's parental rights. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO PRODUCE 
ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and 
Decree ordering the termination of Appellant's parental 
rights on May 9, 1975, and set a hearing date for review of 
the matter in September. Prior to the hearing date, 
Appellant's whereabouts were ascertained, his parole 
revoked, and he was subsequently transferred to the Utah 
State Prison. Appellant's attorney filed a motion to produce 
additional testimony and alternative request for a new trial 
-15-
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on July 16, 1975, for the reason that Appellant was un-
available for past proceedings and was desirous of giving 
testimony in his own behalf and of obtaining custody of 
the minor children. The motion was denied on September 16, 
1975, 
A. The Denial of Appellant's Motion 
Constituted an Abuse of Discretion. 
Courts have not hesitated to build a strong fortress 
around the parent-child relationship, and have stocked it 
with ammunition in the form of established rules and policies 
that add to its impregnability. This paraphrased axiom 
of Justice Henroid is demonstrated by the judicial policy 
of reluctance in Utah to permanently sever family relation-
ships. The Court has repeatedly noted such judicial 
reluctance, which was perhaps best expressed in State v. 
Lance, supra.: 
Deprivation of the parentfs custody of 
their children is a drastic remedy which 
should be resorted to only in extreme 
cases and when it is manifest that the 
home itself cannot or will not correct 
the evils which exist. The cutting of 
family ties is a step of utmost gravity 
and is undesirable both socially and 
economically and should be avoided unless 
that is the only alternative to be found 
consistent with the best interests of the 
chi Idren . Iji. , at 397. 
The Lance decision reflects a composite of principles 
expressed by Justice Crockett in the earlier decision of 
-16-
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State v. Dade, 14 U.2d 47, 376 P.2d 951 (1962). Both Lance 
and Dade concerned deprivation of custody proceedings and 
are pertinent to the case at bar. In Fronk v. State, 
supra, this Court reversed an order terminating parental 
rights and stressed the importance of the family relationship 
stating: 
It [the juvenile court] was not created 
for the purpose of substituting persons, 
other than the natural parents, to take 
over the children. It should seek in every 
way, short of such a substitution, to 
preserve and maintain that bond of parental 
affection which has been throughout the 
existence of mankind the most potent force 
for safeguarding the interest and welfare 
of the oncoming generation. Jjd, at 402. 
Thus, the Utah Courts approach termination of parental rights 
proceedings with a preconceived reluctance to break family 
ties. 
Beyond the judicial reluctance to interfere with 
parental rights, there exists a strong presumption that the 
natural parents are best suited for raising their children. 
This presumption has been noted by this Court on numerous 
occasions and was best expressed in the decision of In Re 
State, 11 U.2d 393, 360 P.2d 486 (1961), which involved 
efforts by the natural parents to regain custody of their 
children: 
Furthermore, this Court has repeatedly 
recognized that there is a presumption 
that it will be for the best interests 
of the child to be raised under the care, 
control and supervision of its natural 
parents. Such presumption is only over-
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come when the trier of the facts is 
convinced by the evidence that the 
welfare of the child requires that the 
child be awarded to someone other than 
the natural parents. Thus, the ultimate 
burden of proof on this question, is 
always in favor of the natural parents 
and against any other person seeking 
custody of such child. Iji, at 397. 
This presumption is also noted in State v. Lance and State 
v. Dade, supra. While this presumption can be rebutted, it 
is strong presumption which will not be taken lightly. 
With the judicial reluctance to terminate parental 
rights and the presumption that it is in the best interests 
of children to be in the custody of their parents in mind, 
an examination of the facts in this case is appropriate. 
The termination of parental rights proceedings were conducted 
in the absence of Appellant. The State, while desiring to 
place the children for adoption, had no affirmative plans 
for adoption and no one in mind to assume the role of parent 
for these children. The natural mother of the children is 
deceased. Had Appellant been able to attend the termination 
proceedings, he would have offered in evidence testimony on 
his behalf and in rebuttal of the other evidence, as is 
set forth in his Affidavit attached to this brief as the 
Appendix. His whereabouts were ascertained shortly after 
the Order of the trial Court terminating his parental rights 
and well before the review hearing was conducted. His 
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intent of desiring to resume custody of his children 
was promptly brought to the Court's attention. Yet,, 
despite all this, and in view of the aforementioned 
judicial reluctance and parental presumption, the Court 
refused to hear the additional testimony in reviewing the 
matter. The additional testimony, had it been allowed, 
would have substantially consisted of the matters set 
forth in the Appendix. Appellant contends that the denial 
of the opportunity to present the additional testimony 
constituted an abuse of discretion. 
The leading case in this jurisdiction on the abuse 
of discretion standard in the custody setting is In Re State, 
supra. In that case, the parents had already had their 
parental rights terminated, and sought restoration of 
custody based on changed conditions approximately five months 
later in a separate proceeding. Their rights were terminated 
in the abserrce of replacement guardians seeking to adopt 
the children. The trial Court refused to grant a hearing 
on the parents1 petition for restoration of custody. On 
appeal the parents made a proffer of the evidence that would 
have been presented had a hearing been conducted, and argued 
that it was error to deny them an opportunity to be heard. 
This Court reversed the decision and directed the lower 
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Court to conduct a hearing. 
However, since the parents have 
presented an issue of fact under which 
the parents probably can make a showing 
that the best interests of these children 
requires that they be reared by their 
natural parents, the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to give them 
a hearing Id, at 398-9 (emphasis added). 
Appellant contends that the present case is squarely within 
the facts and holding of this decision, and therefore that 
it was an abuse of discretion to deny Appellant's motion 
to produce additional testimony. In this case, Appellant 
has intervened shortly after his parental rights were 
terminated and seeks to overturn the termination order. 
His rights were terminated in the absence of replacement 
guardians, and he was denied a hearing for the purpose of 
offering testimony in his behalf. Appellant now makes a 
proffer of what testimony he would offer in evidence, had 
he been afforded the chance, and contends that the trial 
Court abused his discretion. The appeal here is strengthened 
by two factors. First, Appellant's intervention is made 
in the same proceeding which had already set a hearing date 
for review. Second, the parents in In Re State voiced no 
objection to the appropriateness of previously terminating 
their parental rights under the conditions existing at the 
time. In contrast, Appellant challenges the appropriateness 
of the initial termination order under circumstances in 
which he had no opportunity to present his position. Thus, 
In Re State appears to control the resolution of the abuse 
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of discretion issue. 
It is clear from the case law in Utah that this Cour 
will reverse an order terminating parental rights where it 
is shown that the trial Court abused its discretion. 
In Fronk v. State, supra, this Court found such an abuse, 
although the parent had been convicted of a felony, and 
reversed the termination order. The termination proceedings 
were conducted in the absence of the appealing parent, 
and did not contemplate a specific replacement guardian. 
Thus, this decision seems to factually contemplate a 
situation similar to the case at bar, and supports Appellant's 
claim here as to an abuse of discretion. 
There is a significant factual distinction between 
proceedings conducted to terminate parental rights where 
there is or is not a replacement guardian ready to assume 
the role of parent to the minor children. The significance 
lies in the evaluation of the best interests of the child. 
This distinction has been expressed as follows: 
In contrast, in a juvenile court 
proceeding for termination of parental 
rights, the State seeks to sever the 
parent-child relationship without 
regard to whether another alternative 
is available for the child. Here, the 
action or nonaction by the parent and 
its impact on the child must be judged 
by asking whether the situation of the 
cnild in the custody of the biological 
parent is so bad as to warrant termination 
even if the child remains in foster or 
institutional care for the rest of his 
minority. That is a qualitatively 
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different question than making a 
choice between known alternatives of 
adoptive parent or biological parent. 
Aaron, Utah Adoption, 1970 Utah Law 
Review at 342-3 (footnotes omitted, 
emphasis added). 
The thrust of Professor Aaron's comments as applied to a 
situation like the case at bar is that where the State does 
not have affirmative plans for adoption of the children, 
the termination of parental rights at this point serves no 
purpose and therefore does not comport to the objective 
of termination. The issue of termination in such a situation 
thus should not rise until there are present identifiable 
persons to adopt and assume the role of parent. Thus, the 
very fact of terminating parental rights under the facts 
and circumstances of this case suggest that an abuse of 
discretion has occurred. 
When viewing as a whole the judicial reluctance to 
terminate parental rights, the presumption that the parent 
is best suited to have custody of his children, the case 
law in Utah on abuse of discretion in termination proceedings, 
the objectives of termination and the distinction where no 
replacement guardian is present, and the facts and 
circumstances of this case, the trial court committed an 
abuse of discretion in denying Appellant's motion to produce 
additional testimony. 
B. Appellant was Improperly Denied an 
Opportunity to be Heard Consistent 
with Constitutional Principles of 
Due Process of Law. 
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In
 In Re State, supra, this Court suggested (although 
did not hold) that the denial in granting a hearing to the 
adoptive parents by the trial Court may have suffered from 
a lack of due process of law. 
Also,'it is very unusual for a Court 
to attempt to determine facts without 
hearing all of the evidence available 
which has a bearing on that question. 
This is particularly true in a case 
where the trial Court is called upon 
to determine a complicated question 
such as, what will be most beneficial 
to the child. Ordinarily to refuse to 
hear all the evidence available on an 
issue of fact would be a violation of 
due process of law. Xd, 397-8. 
This Court went on to state that, under the particular facts 
of that case, there probably was no lack of due process, 
but resolution of this issue was rendered unnecessary since 
the denial of the hearing was held to constitute an abuse 
of discretion and thus reversible error. 
Justice Henroid, in a well reasoned opinion concurring 
with the In Re State majority, would have found a denial of 
due process of law. After first noting the fact in that case 
the juvenile court, in its order depriving the parents of 
custody, specifically retained continuous jurisdiction until 
an adoption was granted by an appropriate court, the opinion 
commented upon the implications of such a reservation. 
Having done so, without specifying the 
precise purpose therefore, I am of the 
opinion that in this particular case 
inherently was included in such 
reservation of jurisdiction, a requirement 
that the least that could be done upon 
petition for restoration of custody would 
be to hear the natural parents out in --
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eleventh hour hope that it could be 
established that a sincere effort had 
been made on the part of the parents 
to preserve the relationship of parent 
and child, re-establish confidence in 
and enjoy the companionship of those 
who are their own flesh and blood, 
and that their mission had been 
accomplished. Ijd, at 490. 
The facts of the present case suggest that the trial Court 
has also retained continuous jurisdiction over the matter, 
by setting a review hearing date upon its entry of the 
Order terminating Appellants parental rights. Further, 
Appellant's need for a hearing in this case is more 
compelling, since he was not heard at all prior to the 
or ig ina l termination order . Thus to deny Appel lant ' s 
motion to produce new testimony operated as a denial of due 
process of law. 
The facts of the instant case demonstrate secondary 
reasons for finding a denial of due process. The supplemental 
petition seeking permanent deprivation of parental rights 
was filed with the trial Court on November 14, 1972. 
However, the proceedings as to Appellant were not conducted 
until February 5, 1975, and concluded on May 8, 1975, 
a period exceeding two years from the filing of the petition. 
Appellant's whereabouts and readiness to appear in Court 
were readily ascertainable from the date the petition was 
filed until October 23, 1974, a period just under two years. 
His whereabouts became readily ascertainable again on May 
10, 1975, and have remained such since that date. Thus, 
-24-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for reasons unknown to Appellant, the juvenile Court seems 
to have been reluctant to adjudicate his parental rights, 
at least that is until he became unavailable to appear at 
such termination proceedings. Once his whereabouts could 
not be ascertained, the juvenile Court promptly proceeded 
to hear the petition for deprivation of parental rights. 
Then, once Appellant's whereabouts were again ascertainable, 
and despite the fact that a hearing date for review of 
the matter had been set, the juvenile Court resumed its 
unwillingness to further adjucate Appellant's parental 
rights. This whoTe course of judicial conduct smacks of 
abuse, and Appellant submits that such conduct operated as 
a denial of due process of law as to him. In particular, 
that to deny Appellant the opportunity to produce additional 
testimony, in view of the whole course of conduct by the 
juvenile Court, amounted to both an abuse of discretion 
and a denial of due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the facts, law and reasoning set forth herein, 
the decision of the Second District Juvenile Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, should be reversed and Mr. 
Wulfferstein's parental rights restored to him, or in the 
alternative, the trial Court should be required to take 
additional testimony before terminating Mr. Wulfferstein's 
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parental rights. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of 
1976, I hand-delivered a copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to the office of the Attorney General, State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and to the 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 3522 South 700 West, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84119. 
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APPENDIX 
AFFIDAVIT OF ORIN JOHN WULFFENSTEIN 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I S S 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ORIN JOHN WULFFENSTEIN, being first duly sworn 
upon oath, deposes and states: 
That, if he were permitted to adduce further testimony 
and evidence concerning the termination of his parental rights, 
the following would be offered: 
1. That he is the natural father of Tammy Summers 
and Tina Marie Summers, minor children. 
2. That he desires to retain parental rights and 
responsibilities over said minor-children, including regular 
visitation with them.-
3. That he intends to establish a family household 
with said minor children upon his release from the Utah State 
P r i s on . 
4. That the trial court refused to resolve the con-
troversy for a period exceeding two (2) years from the filing 
<r 
of the Petition, during which time he would have been available 
for appearance. 
5. That he was unaware of the court proceedings on 
February 5, 1975, March 12, 1975, and May 8, 1975, and would 
have appeared if he had known of the hearings. -
6. That he has been unable to support said minor 
children since he has been incarcerated for the substantial 
portion of their lives. 
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1. That he made numerous attempts to arrange visi-
tation with the Division of Family Services while in prison 
which proved unsuccessful, 
8. That he was only permitted two (2) visits with 
the children during his release in the Summer, 1973, despite 
attempts made to arrange additional visitation through the 
Division of Family Services. ,.,..„......,.-
DATED this day of April, 1976. 
olL i' ^li<~d 
/ORIN JOHN'MULFFENSTEIN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
of April, 1976. 
O /-_ 
My commission e x p i r e s : 
19 Id /?& ' C ' ^ ; ) 
day 
/ 
/s- )-<AZs^n/J~Y 
(0TARY PUBLIC ^ 
Residing at: 
* 
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